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Abstract
Anomaly detection in supercomputers is a very difficult
problem due to the big scale of the systems and the high
number of components. The current state of the art for
automated anomaly detection employs Machine Learn-
ing methods or statistical regression models in a super-
vised fashion, meaning that the detection tool is trained
to distinguish among a fixed set of behaviour classes
(healthy and unhealthy states).
We propose a novel approach for anomaly detection
in High Performance Computing systems based on a
Machine (Deep) Learning technique, namely a type of
neural network called autoencoder. The key idea is to
train a set of autoencoders to learn the normal (healthy)
behaviour of the supercomputer nodes and, after train-
ing, use them to identify abnormal conditions. This is
different from previous approaches which where based
on learning the abnormal condition, for which there are
much smaller datasets (since it is very hard to identify
them to begin with).
We test our approach on a real supercomputer
equipped with a fine-grained, scalable monitoring in-
frastructure that can provide large amount of data to
characterize the system behaviour. The results are ex-
tremely promising: after the training phase to learn the
normal system behaviour, our method is capable of de-
tecting anomalies that have never been seen before with
a very good accuracy (values ranging between 88% and
96%).
1 Introduction
High Performance Computing (HPC) systems are com-
plex machines with many components that must oper-
ate concurrently at the best of their theoretical perfor-
mance. In reality, many factors can degrade the perfor-
mance of a HPC system: hardware can break, the ap-
plications may enter undesired and unexpected states,
components can be wrongly configured. A critical as-
pect of modern and future supercomputers is the capa-
bility of detecting faulty conditions stemming from the
improper behaviour of one or multiple parts. This issue
is relevant not only for scientific computing systems but
also in data centers and clouds providers, whose busi-
ness strongly relies on the availability of their web ser-
vices. For instance, Amazon in 2016 would have lost
15M$ for just an hour of out of service [HP11]. An au-
tomated process for anomaly detection would be a great
improvement for current HPC systems, and it will prob-
ably be a necessity for future Exascale supercomputers.
Nowadays, monitoring infrastructures are available
in many HPC systems and data centers, used to gather
data about the state of the systems and their compo-
nents thanks to a large variety of measurement sensors.
Given the deluge of data originating from a monitor-
ing framework, real-time identification of problems and
undesired situations is a daunting task for system ad-
ministrators. The growing scale of HPC systems will
only make this task even more difficult. In this paper
we present a novel approach to deal with this issue, re-
lying on a fine-grain monitoring framework and on an
autonomous anomaly detection method that uses Ma-
chine Learning (ML) techniques.
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Automated anomaly detection is still a relatively un-
explored area in the HPC field. The current state-of-the-
art relies on supervised [Mit99] ML methods that learn
to distinguish between healthy and faulty states after a
training phase during which the supercomputer must be
subjected to different conditions, namely the behaviour
classes to be identified, for example normal behaviour
and a set of anomalies. With this scheme, the anomaly
detector learns to classify different classes using labeled
training data.
This requirement complicates the training process: a
supervised algorithm needs to be shown data contain-
ing examples of both healthy and unhealthy status (nor-
mal behaviour and anomalies). Moreover, the data set
should ideally be unbiased and balanced, that is there
should be roughly the same number of examples (data
points in the set) for each class. In HPC systems, data
is very abundant but labels are scarce.
However, in supercomputers the normal behaviour
is predominant – and can be deterministically restored
by system administrators. The same cannot be said
for faulty behaviour, which is undesired, sporadic and
uncontrolled. Furthermore, even when abnormal con-
ditions are observed and dealt with, they are not nec-
essarily stored in logging systems (unless the logging
systems are explicitly designed for this), but rather the
burden of assigning labels to a data set – identify the
corresponding class, healthy/unhealthy – falls onto the
system administrators, a less than ideal situation. Thus
it is not easy and often neither possible to obtain the
correct labeled data sets required by typical supervised
approaches.
Conversely, there is another type of ML that does not
require any label and it is referred to as unsupervised
[Mit99] learning. In this case the data set contains only
the features describing the system state and no labels;
the learning algorithm learns useful properties about the
structure of the dataset. To address the issue, we pro-
pose an anomaly detection method less dependent on
labeled data; to be precise, our approach belongs to the
semi-supervised branch of ML, which combines the two
methodologies described before. Our idea is to use au-
toencoders [GBCB16] to learn the normal behaviour of
supercomputer nodes and then to use them to detect ab-
normal states. In our method we require labels during
the pre-processing phase because we need to obtain a
data set containing only normal conditions. After this
“normal” data set has been obtained the training of the
ML model proceeds in unsupervised fashion, without
the need of labels. A critical advantage of our method
is that it will be able to identify faulty conditions even
though these have not been encountered earlier during
the training phase. With our method we do not need to
inject anomalies during the training phase (possibly not
feasible in a production system) and we do not require
system logs or changes to the standard supercomputer
users’ work flow.
The main contributions of our approach are: 1) a
very precise anomaly detection rate (up to 88%-96%
accuracy); 2) identification of new types of anomalies
unseen during the initial training phase (thanks to its
semi-supervised nature); 3) no need for large amount of
labeled data. To demonstrate the feasibility of our ap-
proach we consider a real supercomputer hosted by the
Italian inter-universities consortium CINECA [CIN].
We use historical data collected with an integrated mon-
itoring system to train our autoencoders and then we test
them by injecting anomalies in a subset of the comput-
ing nodes; the experimental results show how this ap-
proach can distinguish between normal and anomalous
states with a very high level of accuracy.
2 Related Works
2.1 Anomaly Detection in HPC Systems
Tuncer et al. [TAZea17] deal with the problem of di-
agnosing performance variations in HPC systems. The
approach is based on the collection of several measure-
ments gathered by a monitoring infrastructure; from
these measures, a set of statistical features describing
the state of the supercomputer is extracted. The authors
then train different ML algorithms to classify the be-
haviour of the supercomputer using the statistical fea-
tures previously mentioned. Unfortunately the authors
propose a supervised approach which is not perfectly
suited for the HPC context (as discussed previously).
Baseman et al. [BBD+16] propose a similar method
for anomaly detection in HPC systems. They apply
a general statistical technique called classifier-adjusted
density estimation (CADE) to the HPC context. CADE
relies on the observation that combining a uniform den-
sity estimate and the probabilistic output of a classi-
fier results in an accurate density estimator. First they
extract temporal relational features and their gradients
from the sensor data. Then they use both real and arti-
ficially generated data (thanks to density estimation) to
train a supervised classifier, specifically a Random For-
est classifier, in order to rank each data point depending
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on its “anomalousness”. Again, the main limit of this
work is to be based on a supervised approach.
Dani et al. [DDA17] present an unsupervised ap-
proach for anomaly detection in HPC. Their work is
remarkably different from our approach since they do
not rely on a monitoring infrastructure but consider only
the console logs generated by computing nodes. The
goal of the method is to distinguish log messages re-
garding faulty situations from logs generated by nodes
in normal condition; in order to do so clustering meth-
ods (k-means) are used. This work focuses on faults
that can be recognized by a node itself and recorded
in a log message, thus greatly limiting the class of de-
tectable anomalies. Conversely, in our approach we in-
fer anomalies using simply the data collected by a mon-
itoring infrastructure, without requiring a mechanism to
identify anomalies on the nodes.
2.2 Anomaly Detection with Deep Learn-
ing Approaches
Although not yet applied to the HPC field, Deep Learn-
ing based approaches for anomaly detection have been
studied in other areas [KKKea17, KTP18], especially in
recent years.
Lv et al. [LWBL16] propose a deep learning based
algorithm for fault diagnosis in chemical production
systems. The proposed method is capable of real time
detection and classification and, moreover, it can do the
diagnosis online. Nevertheless, their approach is su-
pervised and thus it definitely differs from ours. Lee
et al. [LCK17] introduce a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) model for fault identification and classifi-
cation in semiconductor manufacturing processes. This
method makes it possible to locate the variable and time
information that represents process faults.
Costa et al. [CAG15] describe a fully unsupervised
algorithm for real-time detection of faults in industrial
plants. The algorithm relies on the identification of a
set of features that are then used to learn the normal be-
haviour of the plant, expressing it as a probability den-
sity estimation. The online classifier then uses the dis-
tance from the normal distribution to classify new data
samples. The model is unsupervised and it can handle
unseen types of anomalies. However, the approach is
specifically targeted at plants for industrial process con-
trol and thus not well suited for our HPC system case.
Particularly, a relatively small set of features is consid-
ered w.r.t. to the hundreds (thousands) of metrics found
in a supercomputer.
Ince et al. [IKEea16] discuss a CNN-based method
for electrical motor fault detection; their method can
work directly on the raw measurement data, with no
preprocessing. The neural network combines feature
extraction and classification, but proceeds in a super-
vised manner.
3 Data Collection
A very important aspect for our anomaly detection ap-
proach is the availability of large quantity of data that
monitors and thus describes the state of a supercom-
puter. To test our approach we take advantage of a
supercomputer with an integrated monitoring infras-
tructure able to handle large amounts of data coming
from several different sources. Our target system is
D.A.V.I.D.E.[ABBea17], an energy efficient supercom-
puter developed by E4 Computer Engineering [e4] and
hosted by CINECA in Bologna, Italy. It is composed by
45 nodes with a total peak performance of 990 TFlops
and an estimated power consumption of less than 2 kW
per node. Each node hosts two IBM POWER8 Proces-
sors with NVIDIA NVLink and four Tesla P100 GPUs.
The system was ranked #440 in TOP500 [DMS94] and
#18 in GREEN500 [FC07] in November 2017 list.
The data collection infrastructure deployed in
D.A.V.I.D.E. is called Examon and has been presented
in previous works [BBCea17, BBLea18]. Examon is
a fine-grained, lightweight and scalable monitoring in-
frastructure for Exascale supercomputers. The data
coming from heterogeneous data sources is gathered in
an integrated and uniform repository, making it very
easy to create data sets providing a holistic view of
the supercomputer and thus describing the system state.
The main components of the Examon framework are
a set of agents running outside the computing nodes,
but tightly coupled with them. These agents moni-
tor the power consumption of each computing node at
the plug as well as performance and utilization met-
rics. The monitored values are sent to a data manage-
ment backbone, through a communication layer based
on the open-source MQTT protocol, a TCP/IP protocol
designed for low bandwidth and high latency networks,
with minimal resource demands.
Since there are limitations on the storage space avail-
able for the monitoring infrastructure, it is impossi-
ble to store the raw data. The solution adopted in
D.A.V.I.D.E. was to discard the fine-grained data older
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than a week and to preserve indefinitely job information
and coarse-grained data (long term storage, around 6GB
after 7 months of activity). For this paper, we work with
the coarse-grained data aggregated in 5-minutes long
intervals. Furthermore, we focused on a subset of the
data collected by Examon; for each node we have 166
metrics (our features), i.e. core loads, temperatures, fan
speed, power consumptions, etc.
4 The Autoencoder-based Ap-
proach
We aim at detecting anomalies that happen at the node-
level. Currently, we focus on single nodes. We cre-
ate a set of separate autoencoder models, one for each
node in the system. Each model is trained to learn the
normal behaviour of the corresponding node and to be
activated if anomalous conditions are measured. If an
autoencoder can learn the correlations between the set
of measurements (features) that describe the state of a
supercomputer, then it can consequently notice changes
in these correlations that indicate an abnormal state.
Under normal operating conditions these features are
linked by specific relations (i.e. the power consumption
of a core is directly related to the workload and temper-
ature to the power and frequency). We hypothesize that
these correlations will be perturbed if the system enters
in an anomalous state.
The reconstruction error is the element we use to
detect anomalies. An autoencoder can be trained to
minimize this error. In doing so, it learns the relation-
ships among the features of the input set. If we feed a
trained autoencoder with data not seen during the train-
ing phase, it should reproduce the new input with good
fidelity, at least if the new data resemble the data used
for the training. If this is not the case, the autoencoder
cannot correctly reconstruct the input and the error will
be greater. We propose to detect anomalies by observ-
ing the magnitude of the reconstruction error.
All autoencoders have the same structure. We opted
for a fairly simple structure composed by three lay-
ers: I) an input layer with as many neurons as the
number of features (166), II) a densely connected in-
termediate sparse layer [BC+08] with 1660 neurons
(ten times the number of features) with Rectified Lin-
ear Units (ReLu) as activation functions and a L1 norm
regularizer [GBCB16], III) a final dense output layer
with 166 neurons with linear activations. This network
was obtained after an empirical evaluation, after hav-
ing experimented with different topologies and parame-
ter configurations. To summarize, our methodology has
the following steps: 1) create an autoencoder for each
computing node in the supercomputer; 2) train the au-
toencoders using data collected during normal operat-
ing conditions; 3) identify anomalies in new data using
the reconstruction error obtained by the autoencoders.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In every HPC system there are multiple possible sources
of anomalies and fault conditions, ranging from hard-
ware faults to software errors. In this paper we verify
the proposed approach on a type of anomaly that easily
arises in real systems and happens at the level of single
nodes, namely misconfiguration. More precisely, we
consider the misconfiguration of the frequency gover-
nor of a computing node. Modern Linux systems allow
to specify different policies regulating the clock speed
of the CPUs, thanks to kernel-level drivers referred as
frequency governors [BG13]. Different policies have
different impacts on the clock speed, frequency and
power consumption of the CPUs.
We considered three different policies. The first one,
conservative, is the default policy on D.A.V.I.D.E. (the
normal behaviour); it sets the CPU clock depending on
the current CPU load. Two other types of policies have
been used to generate anomalies, i) the powersave pol-
icy and ii) the performance policy. These frequency
governors statically set the CPU to the, respectively,
lowest and highest frequency in the allowed range.
5.1 Results
In this work we used an off-line approach. We gathered
the measurements collected during months of real us-
age of D.A.V.I.D.E. and we created a data set; the data
is normalized to have values in the range [0, 1]. The
data set is split in 3 components: 1) the training set
DTrain (containing data points within periods of nor-
mal behaviour), 2) the test set without anomalies DNTest
(again, only periods of normal behaviour) and 3) the test
set with anomaliesDATest (the periods when we injected
anomalies on some nodes).
For these experiments we selected a subset of the data
collected by Examon during D.A.V.I.D.E. lifetime. The
period we considered is 83 days long, from March 2018
to May 2018. During this period D.A.V.I.D.E. was in
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the normal state for most of the time – 66 days, 80% of
the time – while we forced anomalous states for smaller
sub-periods of a few days, 13 days in total. Since
we know when the anomalies were injected identify-
ing DATest is trivial. DTrain and D
N
Test were created by
randomly splitting the data points belonging to the 66
days of normal state, 80% of the data points going to
DTrain and 20% to DNTest.
Each autoencoder is trained with Adam [KB14] op-
timizer with standard parameters, minimizing the mean
absolute error; the number of epochs used in the train-
ing phase is 100 and the batch size has a fixed value
(32). These values were chosen after a preliminary ex-
ploration because they guarantee very good results with
very low computational costs. The time required to
train the network is around 5 minutes on a quad-core
processor (Intel i7-5500U CPU 2.40GHz) with 16GB
of RAM (without using GPUs).
5.1.1 Reconstruction Error-Based Detection
As explained previously, our anomaly detection method
relies on the hypothesis that an autoencoder can be
taught to learn the correlations among the features in
a data set representing the healthy state of a supercom-
puter node. In this case the autoencoder would be ca-
pable to reconstruct an input data set never seen before,
if this new input resembles the healthy one used dur-
ing the training phase – if in the unseen data set the
features correlations are preserved. Conversely, an au-
toencoder would struggle to reconstruct data sets where
the learned correlations do not hold. To demonstrate
our hypothesis, we expect to observe higher reconstruc-
tion errors for the anomalous periods with respect to the
error obtained in normal periods. We are not strictly in-
terested in the absolute value of the reconstruction error
but rather on the relative difference between normal and
anomalous periods.
This reconstruction error is plotted in Figure 1; it
displays the results computed for node davide45 (other
nodes were omitted for space reason but their behaviour
is very similar). The x-axis and y-axis show, respec-
tively, the time and the normalized reconstruction er-
ror (we sum the error for each feature and divide by
the number of features NF ). The reconstruction error
trend is plotted with a light blue line; the gaps in the line
represent periods when the node was idle and that have
been removed from the data set.
We observe 6 anomalous periods (highlighted by col-
ored lines along the x-axis): during the first 5 (red lines)
Figure 1: Reconstruction error for node davide45
the frequency governor was set to powersave while dur-
ing the last one (blue) the governor was set to perfor-
mance. The reconstruction error is never exactly zero,
but this is not our concern: our analysis does not rely
on the absolute value of the error, but rather on the rela-
tive magnitude of the errors computed for different data
sets. The reconstruction error is indeed greater when the
nodes are in an anomalous state, as underlined by the
higher values in the y-axis in the periods correspond-
ing to anomalies. Hence, the autoencoder struggles to
recreate the “faulty” input data set.
Although the plot shown is promising, it does not
actually show that the reconstruction error for unseen
healthy input is actually lower than the error committed
with anomalous periods. This happens because the nor-
mal behaviour data set was randomly split in the subset
DTrain and DNTest and it is impossible to distinguish
between them by simply looking at the plot. However,
our insight is backed by the quantitative analysis, as
summarized in Table 1. To measure the quality of the
anomaly detection we rely on the Mean Absolute Error
(MAE) and on the Root Mean Squared Error (RSME).
For each autoencoder we computed MAE and RSME
for every set DTrain, DNTest and D
A
Test.
The results obtained for all autoencoders are very
similar but in order to make a fair comparison between
different nodes we do not use the absolute values of
MAE and RSME but we rather employ a normalized
version: the normalized MAE (RSME) is obtained by
dividing the actual MAE (RSME) by the MAE (RSME)
computed for DTrain. In this way we force the normal-
ized error for the training set to be equal to 1 (since we
are not strictly interested in its absolute value) and we
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DNTest D
A
Test
Normalized MAE 1.08 14.54
Normalized RMSE 1.17 11.18
Table 1: Quantitative Analysis: average over all nodes
highlight the relative difference of error between sets.
If the normalized error for a test set is close to one this
means that the autoencoder was able to reconstruct the
input quite well; larger errors imply that the autoen-
coder was not capable to reproduce the input – these
situations are those that we claim to be anomalies.
In Table 1 we can see the results for the test sets.
The error for the DATest is the average value obtained
considering both anomaly types. The normalized er-
ror for DTrain has not been reported since it is always
equal to 1. The values reported in the table are the av-
erage computed over all the autoencoders (as many as
in the chosen subset of nodes of D.A.V.I.D.E.). The re-
sults clearly indicate that our hypothesis holds true (as
hinted also by the previous plot with the reconstruction
error). Both the average normalized MAE and RSME
for the test set with no anomalies DNTest are very close
to 1, suggesting that the autoencoders have correctly
learned the correlations between the measured features
of a healthy system. Therefore, when the autoencoders
are fed with unseen input that preserve these correla-
tions they can reconstruct it with good precision. On the
contrary, the autoencoders cannot correctly reproduce
new input that does not resemble a healthy system, that
is a system in an anomalous state. This is shown by the
markedly higher normalized MAE and RSME obtained
for DATest.
We can also make an additional observation: there
is clearly a difference between the reconstruction errors
of the two anomalies (powersave and performance), as
highlighted by the notably different values of MAE and
RSME for DA1Test and D
A2
Test. In particular, larger nor-
malized MAE and RMSE suggest that the autoencoders
are less capable to reconstruct the input composed by
data points with powersave frequency governor. In a
certain sense, this means that this frequency governor
policy is a more anomalous condition than the perfor-
mance case, i.e. it disrupts the features correlations in
a more marked way. Why does this happens? A possi-
ble explanation is that the performance frequency gov-
ernor has a behaviour closer to the default conservative
one: when a computing node in a supercomputer is ac-
tive, its frequency tends to reach the maximum allowed
value quite rapidly because HPC applications are opti-
mized to optimally use the computing resources at their
disposal. Thus, the performance mode has a more sim-
ilar footprint to the conservative one compared to the
powersave case, where instead the frequency is fixed to
the lowest possible value, not a common situation for
an active HPC node.
5.1.2 Detection Accuracy
So far we have observed the reconstruction error trends
obtained by our approach based on autoencoders, but
we still have to discuss how the reconstruction error
can be used to actually detect an anomaly. Our goal
is to identify an error threshold θ to discriminate be-
tween normal and anomalous behaviour. In order to do
so we shall start by looking at the distributions of the
reconstruction errors. Again, we are considering each
autoencoder (and thus corresponding node) separately.
We distinguish the errors distribution for healthy data
sets (DTrain ∪ DNTest) and for the unhealthy data set
(DATest).
Figure 2 shows the error distributions for the autoen-
coder corresponding to node davide45 – again other
nodes have the same behaviour. The graph contains the
histograms of the error distributions; in the x-axis we
have the reconstruction error and in the y-axis there is
the number of data points with the corresponding error.
The left-most sub-figure (Fig. 2a) shows the error dis-
tribution for the normal data set (DTrain ∪DNTest) and
the other one (Fig. 2b) shows the distribution for the
anomalous data set. It is quite easy to see that the errors
distribution of the normal data set is extremely different
from the anomalous one.
Since we can clearly distinguish the error distribu-
tions we opted for a simple method to classify each
data point: if the reconstruction error Ei for data point
i is greater than a threshold θ, then the point is “ab-
normal”; otherwise the data point is considered normal.
The next step is to identify the threshold used to clas-
sify each data point. We choose as a threshold the n-th
percentile of the errors distribution of the normal data
set, where n is a value that depends on the specific au-
toencoder/node. For example in the case of davide45
(Fig. 2), if n = 95 the threshold is equal to 0.082;
this means that 95% of the errors in the normal data
set (Fig. 2a) are smaller than this value. Hence, if a data
point fed to our trained autoencoder generates an error
greater than 0.082 we classify it as anomalous. In order
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(a) Normal data set (b) Anomaly data set
Figure 2: Error distribution for node davide45
to find the best n value for each autoencoder we em-
ployed a simple generate-and-test search strategy, that
is we performed experiments with a finite number of
values and then chose those guaranteeing the best re-
sults in term of classification accuracy.
Broadly speaking, the best results are obtained with
higher thresholds, i.e. n ≥ 93. To asses the accuracy
of the classification (thus the goodness of the threshold)
we compute the F-score [VR79] for each class; in our
case we have two classes, normal (N) and anomaly (A).
The F-score is a widespread metric to measure the accu-
racy of a classification test and can assume values in the
[0, 1] range, with values closer to 1 indicating a higher
accuracy. In Table 2 we see some results. In the first
column from the left there is the node whose autoen-
coder F-score values are reported (we report the values
for only a subgroup of nodes). The remaining columns
report the F-score values for 3 different n-th percentiles
(and therefore different thresholds); there are two F-
score values for each n-th percentile, one computed for
the normal class (N) and one for the anomaly class (A).
The table can be divided in three subparts (separated
by horizontal lines): 1) the first one contains nodes sim-
ilar to davide45, i.e. nodes where most of the anomalies
were of type powersave; 2) the second group is com-
prised of nodes where most of the anomalies had the
frequency governor set to performance; 3) the last group
(the last row) is the average of the other nodes. In gen-
eral we can see that the F-score values are very good,
highlighting the high accuracy of our approach. A no-
table difference can be observed between the two sub-
groups of nodes. In nodes with a prevalence of pow-
Node 95-th perc. 97-th perc. 99-th perc.N A N A N A
davide17 0.97 0.89 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.97
davide19 0.97 0.90 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.97
davide45 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.98
davide27 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.77 0.86 0.52
davide28 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.89 0.90 0.69
davide29 0.97 0.75 0.98 0.82 0.99 0.85
Average 0.96 0.87 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.82
Table 2: Classification Results
ersave anomalies higher thresholds (higher n-th values)
guarantee better results: this happens because, as seen
for instance in Figure 2, the error distributions are more
separable. In the case of nodes characterized by more
anomalies of performance type, increasing the thresh-
old does not necessarily improve the accuracy – al-
though this can still occur for some nodes. In these
nodes it is harder to distinguish normal data points from
anomalies of type performance (since they behave sim-
ilarly). Hence, simply increasing the threshold is not
beneficial, for example for both davide27 and davide28
the best n-th value found through our empirical explo-
ration is n = 94. The underlying reason is that increas-
ing the threshold (for these nodes) leads to a marked
increase in the number of false negatives.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an approach to detect anoma-
lies in a HPC system that relies on large data sets col-
lected via a lightweight and scalable monitoring frame-
work and employs autoencoders to distinguish between
normal and anomalous system states.
In the future we plan to further validate our method
by testing it on a broader set of anomalies. Our goal
is to expand the anomaly detection technique in order
to be able to also classify different types of anomalies;
in addition to recognize that the system is in an anoma-
lous state, the autoencoder (possibly a refined and more
complex version) will be also able to distinguish among
different anomaly classes and sources. We also plan
to implement our approach in a on-line prototype to
perform real-time anomalous detection on a supercom-
puter, again using D.A.V.I.D.E. as a test bed.
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